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Energy Policy and Naval Strategy

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Weinstein remains convinced that Japan's post-World War II early leaders such as Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida figured out as early as 1946 exactly what the postwar political situation to the present and beyond was going to be like, wisely planned accordingly, and have virtually created the present Japan-United States security system to meet Japan's own desires to provide for its own internal defense while relying exclusively on the United States for external defense. Once Weinstein's assumption is granted, it is possible to make some facts fit the argument. However, Weinstein implies that since these forces would not be effective against external attack, they must be intended for internal security purposes. One wonders what role the most expensive items in Japan's defense arsenal: helicopter-carrying destroyers, F-4 Phantoms, and teardrop hull submarines are supposed to play in domestic population control. Mr. Osamu Kaihara, an articulate ex Defense bureaucrat and the foremost advocate of what Weinstein claims Japan has done, is on record in several well-written books and articles criticizing the lack of design and mission definition of Japan's armed forces. The result, Kaihara states, is that no mission, internal or external, can be carried out efficiently.

The most notable lack of the book as a whole is the absence of even one chapter commenting directly on what at least would interest military readers, namely the military effectiveness of Japan's armed forces. Despite their problems and unpopularity, if they were a significant regional or international military body, their import would be obvious. If they are of minimal value to any present or future military conflict, their existence is merely academic. A chapter on military effectiveness pointing out how almost totally ineffectual the forces would be by themselves but how they could have a significant effect if they were to be employed in

support of U.S. forces under the Mutual Security Treaty and how they could be made significantly more effective within the budgetary, public opinion, political, and constitutional realities of present day Japan would have made this very worthwhile reading volume even more valuable.

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Bucknell, Howard. *Energy Policy and Naval Strategy*. Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage Professional Paper in International Studies, Sage Publications, 1975. 68pp.

Captain Bucknell's Sage paper examines U.S. energy needs, shortfalls, and strategies and concludes that, notwithstanding vigorous national energy policies, dependence on seaborne foreign petroleum will remain a critical element in the Nation's economic, social, and political health through the remainder of this century. Given this unavoidable dependency, the U.S. Navy must be revitalized as the touchstone of a viable foreign policy.

Two-thirds of the paper carefully outlines and defines U.S. energy problems through the 1990's in a thorough and balanced fashion. Energy sources, requirements, and potential substitutes are well researched and presented with the aid of an ample number of graphics.

Few direct or related issues are ignored. Optimistic and pessimistic forecasts are fairly reviewed and evaluated. Even the capital and social demands of overlapping economic and ecological interests and concerns are highlighted and weighed. The costs of reacting to necessity are staggering, but the author persuasively argues that the predictable consequences of inaction are unacceptable.

Captain Bucknell also argues that national policy options are limited. Real energy conservation must be effected, and petroleum stockpiles must be

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urgently rebuilt if international crises are to be managed. Expanded domestic exploration and production must be encouraged and actively supported. Substitute energy technology must be vigorously pursued and funded.

All of these measures, however, will only ameliorate energy dependence on Western and Eastern Hemisphere sources through the year 2000. They cannot solve the problem. "Independence by 1985" is toasted as a misleading catch-phrase.

In the interim, the United States must maintain a strong domestic and export economy to pay for massive energy imports. Both will require an active oceanic commerce and a foreign policy which supports it. To be effective, these interests must be buttressed by adequate military capability—particularly a strong Navy to insure sea control.

The final third of the paper focuses on the comparative weakness of the U.S. Fleet vis-à-vis the growing modern missile forces of the U.S.S.R. The author categorically states that our failure to maintain a first-rate Navy has undermined overall national U.S. military capabilities and has significantly increased both the probability and risks of war.

Captain Bucknell argues that the U.S. Fleet is deficient in offensive capability and would likely be faced down or defeated in any direct naval confrontation overseas with the Soviet Fleet in the near future, unless circumstances favored us. To overcome this deficiency, the fleet should be modernized with standoff cruise missiles and nuclear propulsion. Innovative ASW approaches are required to mitigate the effects of numerical shortfalls versus worldwide commitments.

While it is difficult for this reviewer to argue with the general thrust of Captain Bucknell's position, the limited presentation of this argument does not support his case. It is heavily dependent

on generalizations which assume a greater knowledge by the reader on the breadth and detail of sea warfare and comparative battle strengths than can be reasonably expected. Further, some corrective imperatives such as a rapid transition to nuclear propulsion to meet numerical force deficiencies would appear desirable but impracticable for the same economic reasons which make overall energy solutions unlikely in the foreseeable future.

While these shortcomings are identifiable, they are also understandable. The short format of this paper does not allow for an adequate or balanced comparison of naval strengths and weaknesses of the United States and Soviet fleets and the strategies which such study would recommend.

The real strength of this paper is the terse but extraordinarily complete overview of U.S. energy problems over the next few decades. The bibliography and notes are excellent, particularly on recent energy studies and policies since 1972. This presentation supports the national requirement for a revitalized Navy to meet the potential Soviet threat at sea, but inadequately sketches the naval balance, necessary forces, or strategies to carry it out except in broad generalities. One hopes Captain Bucknell will soon have the opportunity to expand on his evaluation of the Navy and its future course.

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Fowler, William M. *Rebels Under Sail, The American Navy during the Revolution*. New York: Scribner's, 1976. 345pp. Index.

With disarming candor, William Fowler warns his readers in the introduction to this volume to beware "Bicentennial fever" whose symptoms, apparently, are hyperbolic references to national "firsts" and unwarranted enthusiasm for all things 200 years old.